



















































































































































































































































Networks, interpersonal links and group memberships are extremely important in many
poor people’s lives. This is increasingly recognized both by researchers and development
practitioners. Networks and groups aﬀect information ﬂows and behavioral patterns and
may complement or substitute for market mechanisms in the provision of many goods
including credit and insurance. The implications of this for policy are many and varied:
existing network structures may impact on the eﬀectivness of development interventions
including those designed to increase access to credit and insurance; some interventions
may lead to changes in network structure that compromise people’s ability to cope in their
absence; others might harness the networking and grouping capacities of people, both
making use of and strengthening the networks as a result. The details of these processes
depend, to a large extent, on how networks and groups are formed and what factors (both
individual and environmental) aﬀect who chooses to group or network with whom. The aim
of this paper is to shed light, both theoretically and empirically, on the group formation
mechanisms that come to the fore when risk sharing is the objective and enforcement is
scarce.
The networks and groups formed by people when endeavoring to cope with the risks as-
sociated with living close to subsistence have attracted particular attention. We now know
that informal risk sharing groups or networks rarely if ever encompass entire communities
(Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Murgai et al. (2002), De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), Bold
and Dercon (2009) and others) and we have sound theoretical explanations as to why this
is so (Genicot and Ray (2003), Bloch et al. (2008), Bramoull´ e and Kranton (2007) and
Ambrus et al. (2008)). We also know that, within communities, risk sharing groups and
networks are not randomly formed.
In empirical studies, who shares risk with whom is strongly correlated with networks of
kinship, caste and friendship and, to a lesser extent, with variables such as geographical
proximity and demographic similarities that may be proxying for other types of social net-
work (see for example, Fafchamp and Gubert (2007), De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), Dekker
(2004), Munshi and Rosenzweig ( 2009), Mazzocco and Saini (2008)). These ﬁndings are2
not inconsistent with theories of risk sharing as a repeated exchange (Kimball (1988);
Coate and Ravallion (1993); Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2001); and
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009)) and with theories that
incorporate intrinsic motivations such as altruism or anticipated guilt on breaking a so-
cial norm (e.g. Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikof (1992); Ravallion and Dearden (1988); Cox
(1987); Cox, Eser and Jimenez (1998); Cox and Fafchamps (2007)).
Network and group structure and formation have also been analyzed in models of micro-
credit. Who groups with whom when group loans with joint liability are oﬀered, how this
process is aﬀected by individual preferences and the nature of the contract on oﬀer, and
how it may in turn aﬀect the eﬃcacy of group lending have each received considerable at-
tention. Ghatak (1999, 2000) shows theoretically that in group lending with joint liability
risk neutral people group assortatively with respect to the riskiness of their portfolios and
that this mitigates the problem of adverse selection. Ahlin (2009) then extends the model
to sequential group lending and ﬁnds evidence of assorting on portfolio riskiness in a Thai
microcredit program. However, since social networks are not controlled for in the analysis,
he cannot rule out the possibility that socially connected individuals are both more alike
with respect to their risk attitudes and more likely to group together. In contrast, allow-
ing for risk aversion and insurance motives, Sadoulet (2000) predicts and Carpenter and
Sadoulet (1999) ﬁnd evidence of heterogenous grouping. This suggests that risk attitudes
may play a role in the group formation process not only via portfolio choice but also di-
rectly and in combination with portfolio riskiness. Some evidence of assortative grouping
with respect to risk attitudes was found by Gine et al (2009) among subjects participating
in series of lab-type experiments designed to simulate group lending with joint liability in
Peru but only among groups facing dynamic incentives. However, the study did provide
further evidence of the role of social networks in the group formation process.
In the theoretical literature on microﬁnance social networks assume two roles: they allow
information to ﬂow, thereby reducing information asymmetries, and they support mutual
enforcement through social disapproval and the threat of exclusion (Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999)). In some models the role of the network is implicit. Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Ahlin3
(2009), for example, assume that borrowers have more information about each other’s
portfolios than lenders. In other models the role of networks is explicitly investigated.
Besley and Coate (1995), for example, present a model in which more socially connected
groups of borrowers display higher repayment rates. However, Chowdhury (2007) shows
that when group lending is sequential and renewal is contingent, while moral hazard is
lower in groups of socially connected individuals, whether socially connected individuals
choose to group together depends on the discount factor.
The theoretical studies cited above highlight three determining factors in group forma-
tion: individual preferences and attitudes towards risk; pre-existing social networks; and
the function that the groups are to perform conditional on their context (risk-sharing, shar-
ing rules, enforcement, ...). They also suggest that these three factors interact in a variety
of diﬀerent and often complex ways. Ultimately, which are the most important factors and
how they aﬀect group formation is an empirical matter. However, the empirical evidence
on these issues is very limited. This paper aims to (partially) redress this situation by
analyzing the interaction between social networks and individual attitudes towards risk on
group formation, while experimentally holding group function and context constant.
To this end, we use a unique database containing information on the behaviour of a
large number of subjects in a version of the risk-pooling game (Barr and Genicot, 2008:
Barr, Dekker, and Fafchamps, 2008) in 70 Colombian communities. Our experiment is
exceptional in a number of ways. First, it can be directly linked to a household survey
that provides very rich data on the experimental participants, the households to which
they belong and the communities in which they live. Second, it can also be linked to
data on the social ties that exist between all of the participants. Third, the experiment
was designed to generate data not only on who chooses to share risk with whom, but also
on individual risk attitudes. Fourth, the experimental protocol was designed to ensure
that the participants were embedded within rather than isolated from their usual social
environment when making their choices. And ﬁfth, it is one of the largest (in terms of
numbers of participants) experiments ever to have been undertaken. Combined, these
attributes yield a unique opportunity to study the formation of risk sharing networks and4
groups and especially the nature of the interaction between risk attitudes and pre-existing
networks in this process.
The risk-pooling game involves two rounds. In the ﬁrst round, participants indepen-
dently play a version of Binswanger’s (1980) gamble choice game. Behaviour in this game
provides information about individual attitudes towards risk. In the second round, partic-
ipants play the game again but have the opportunity, prior to playing, to form risk sharing
groups within which the proceeds of all members’ second round gambles are divided equally.
However, the group forming agreements are not enforced and group members can secretly
defect from the agreement to share after ﬁnding out the outcome of their own second
round gamble. Thus, group formation depends on trust. As we mention above, we have
information on the network ties that exist between the experimental participants.
The main objective of this paper is to model group formation in the risk sharing game,
focusing speciﬁcally on the roles of individual risk attitudes, social networks and the trust
we assume they embody, and the interaction between the two. To inform our empirical
analysis, we use a theoretical model in which individuals are heterogenous in terms of their
levels of risk aversion and trustworthiness and are variably embedded in a trust-supporting
social network. We show that individuals prefer to group with close friends and relatives
with similar risk attitudes. When grouping with individuals outside their social network,
untrustworthy individuals are opportunistic, defaulting on risk-sharing arrangements when
it pays to do so and lying about their type, i.e., both their trustworthiness and their level
of risk aversion, in order to convince others to group with them. Within this context of
limited trust, individuals may prefer to group with others whose risk attitudes diﬀer from
their own and therefore have an incentive to misrepresent their risk attitudes. Hence, the
assorting process may be perturbed and group formation discouraged among un-networked
individuals.
Applying a dyadic regression approach we investigate whether these eﬀects are manifest
in the data from our risk-pooling game. Our empirical ﬁndings are consistent with our
predictions: dyads who share a close bond of friendship or kinship are more likely to group
together and to group assortatively with respect to their risk attitudes as compared to5
unfamiliar dyads; and, as an individual’s close friends and family options increase, they
are increasingly less likely to group with unfamiliar others.
Our results are among the ﬁrst to show that group formation is assortative with respect
of attitudes towards risk. We also show that this eﬀect is tempered by the fact that they
are operative only among individuals who know, and probably trust, each other well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design. The
theoretical framework is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the empirical
speciﬁcation. Results are then discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Experimental Design
The subjects. The experiment was conducted by a team of professional ﬁeld researchers
in 70 Colombian municipalities during the ﬁrst quarter of 2006. The subjects of our exper-
iments were all participants in a survey designed to evaluate the government of Colombia’s
conditional cash transfer program ‘Familias en Acci´ on’ (FeA).
1
The sampling strategy for the FeA evaluation involved: ﬁrst, selecting a sample, strati-
ﬁed by region and level of infrastructure, of the municipalities that were to receive the FeA
intervention during the evaluation phase; second, selecting a matching sample of munici-
palities that were not to receive the FeA intervention; and third, selecting a geographically
clustered sample of households from the poorest strata in each municipality.
2 There were
122 municipalities involved in the evaluation. The experiment reported here was conducted
in 70 of these. In these municipalities, each household participating in the evaluation sur-
vey was invited to send one adult, preferably the household head or his/her spouse, to the
session in their municipality. A total of 2,512 individuals took part in the experiment.
The survey data is drawn from the FeA evaluation survey.
1The FeA program makes cash transfers to households conditional on a pledge from them that all of their
children will complete primary school and that the senior woman will attend some nutrition workshops.
2The Colombian government assigns each and every household in the country to one of six categories
according to how well oﬀ or poor they are. Social welfare programs are, then, targeted at those in the
poorest one or two categories. FeA is targeted at the poorest only.6
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for our experimental subjects. In this table,
the ﬁrst and second columns contain the proportions, means, and corresponding standard
errors for as many of the 2,512 subjects as we can match to the survey data in the case
of each variable, and the third and fourth columns present the same statistics but for the
sample upon which the dyadic regression analysis was ultimately performed.3 Eighty seven
percent were female, 77 percent were married, 29 percent were heads of households. Their
average age was 42 years and, on average, they had 3.7 years of education. Thirty-four
percent lived in municipal centers, i.e., the small towns or villages in which the municipal
administrations are situated and the experimental sessions were conducted, while the re-
maining 66 percent lived in the surrounding rural clusters. The average monthly household
consumption (including consumption of own farm outputs) for this sample at the time of
the experiments was 430,000 Colombian Pesos (approximately US$190). This is low and
reﬂects the fact that only households in the poorest of six income categories deﬁned by the
Colombian government are eligible for the FeA.
The data on friendships and kinships between experimental subjects was collected dur-
ing the experimental sessions. Following registration, the ﬁeld researchers constructed a
complete list of all those present in the session. Then, each participant was asked whether
they were related to or friends with each of the other people named on the list. Approx-
imately one quarter recognized kin among their fellow participants. One recognized as
many as ﬁve. As shown in Table 1, the average participant recognized 0.3. Friendship was
more commonplace. Approximately three quarters recognized friends among their fellow
participants, with two recognizing as many as 16. The average participant recognized 2.4.
The gamble choice game. The experiment was based on a version of the risk-pooling
game (Barr, 2003; Barr and Genicot, 2008; Barr, Dekker and Fafchamps, 2008). This
game is divided into two rounds each involving a gamble choice game executed in strict
accordance with the following protocol.
3128 individuals had to be dropped from the analysis due to mismatches between the experimental and
survey data and to missing data points in the survey. A further 58 were eﬀectively dropped during the
estimation because they related to either the one municipality in which all the participants formed a single
risk sharing group or the one municipality in which none of the participants formed risk sharing groups.7
Each subject i is called to a private meeting with a ﬁeld researcher and asked to choose
one gamble  i out of six gambles oﬀered L≡{ 1,2,...6} ranked from the least to the
most risky. Every gamble   ∈Lyields either a high payoﬀ ¯ y  or low payoﬀ y
  each with
probability 0.5. Once the gamble is chosen, the payoﬀ is determined by playing a game
that involves guessing which of the researcher’s hands contains a blue rather than a yellow
counter. We denote as yi( i) i’s realized gamble gain. If the subject ﬁnds the blue counter,
she receives the high payoﬀ associated with the gamble of her choice, ¯ y i. If she ﬁnds the
yellow counter, she receives the low payoﬀ associated with that gamble, y
 i.
The six gambles are reported in Table 2 (and presented in Figure 1). The chart in the
ﬁgure is also used to explain the gambles to the participants, many of whom had very little
formal education or were even illiterate.The six gambles are similar but not identical to
those used by Binswanger (1980). They have been adjusted to accord with the Colombian
currency. On the chart, each gamble   ∈{ 1,2,...6} is depicted as two piles of money, the
high payoﬀ (¯ y )o nablue background and the low payoﬀ (y
 )o nayellow background.
Table 2 presents the expected returns on each gamble, which vary from 3,000 to 6,000
Colombian Pesos, their standard deviations, which lie between 0 and 8,458 Columbian
Pesos, and the ranges of CRRA associated with each gamble choice.4
During the ﬁrst round of the experiment, the gamble choice was introduced and explained
to the subjects in their private meetings, where their comprehension was also tested. Once
they had made their decisions and had played out the gamble of their choice, they were
given a voucher for the value of their winnings and asked to sit separately from those who
had not yet played to await further instructions. Their ﬁrst round gamble choices provides
a measure of their individual risk attitudes.
The risk-pooling game. Once everyone had played Round 1, Round 2 of the experiment
was explained.
In Round 2, the participants were told that they would play the gamble choice game
again, that is they would be called separately one by one and oﬀered the same choice of
4The average earnings during the experiment were 5,841 and 6,126 Columbian Pesos in Rounds 1 and 2
respectively. At the time, the oﬃcial exchange rate was around 2,284 Colombian Pesos per US dollar.8
gambles. However, this time, before going to their meetings, the participants could choose
to form ‘sharing groups’. Within sharing groups, second round winnings would be pooled
and shared equally. However, in their private meetings, after seeing the outcome of their
gambles, each participant would be given the option to withdraw from their sharing group
taking their winnings with them, but also forfeiting their share of the other member’s
winnings.
All of this was explained to the participants prior to forming and registering their groups
and it was also made clear that all decisions made during private meetings between in-
dividual participants and researchers would be treated as conﬁdential by the researchers.
So, members of sharing groups could secretly leave their groups (but without knowing the
choice or outcome of others’ gambles), taking their second round gamble winnings with
them, but forfeiting their share of the winnings of others. If one or more members with-
drew from a group, the rest of the gains within the group were pooled and divided equally
between the remaining group members. Following the explanations and the presentation
of a number of examples designed to demonstrate the eﬀects of grouping and the eﬀects of
group members subsequently withdrawing on both their own and fellow group members’
winnings, the participants were invited to a luncheon and given one to one and a half hours
to form their groups.
Denote as y ≡ y1,...yn the vector of gamble outcomes for all participants. Their second
round earnings can be represented as follows. For all subjects i =1 ,..n, let di be an
indicator that takes the value 1 if i stays in the group she joined and 0 if she defects. The






j∈S yj( j)dj  
j∈S dj if di =1
yi( i) if di =0
(1)
3. Model
In this section, we present a stylized model of the experiment that will help us inter-
pret the results. We organize the theoretical material as follows. We ﬁrst describe the9
components of the model in Section 3.1. Before we can derive a set of predictions relating
to group formation, we need to understand the properties of the model with respect to
individual choice, given their grouping decisions. This we do in Section 3.2. In section 3.3,
we use the results pertaining to individual choices to characterize group formation. We
study the individual’s preferred choice of partner, how this may incentivize them to mis-
represent their type and the stable partitions of individuals into groups. To illustrate some
of the results, in Section 3.4 we provide some numerical examples. Finally, we conclude
the theoretical part of the paper with a summary of the main empirical predictions of our
model in Section 3.5.
3.1. Premise of the model. We construct an environment which is as similar as possible
to the game played in the ﬁeld, although we need to make some simplifying assumption
for analytical tractability. We make four important simpliﬁcations that allow us to obtain
some analytical results: ﬁrst, we assume that individuals choose from a continuum of
lotteries; second, we assume that individuals can only form groups of size two; third, we
assume that subjects do not make additional transfers to each other during or after and
as a result of the games and ﬁnally, we make some speciﬁc assumptions about the utility
function.
Lotteries. When taking part in the gamble choice game, individuals choose one out of
six gambles with diﬀerent expected incomes and risk (see Figure 1 in the Appendix and
Table 2). For the model, we can view the gamble choice as a choice of σ ≥ 0 where σ
represents a lottery that earns ¯ y(σ)=b+h(σ) with a probability 1/2 and y(σ)=b−σ with
a probability 1/2. Notice that, unlike in the experiment, the choice of lotteries considered
here is continuous.
Groups. Consider a community I with n subjects. To participate in the second round
of the experiment, subjects partition themselves into “sharing groups” S1,...Sm. These
groups are exhaustive and mutually exclusive ∪j=1,..mSj = I and Sj ∩ Sk = 0 for k  = j.10
For tractability, we shall assume that these groups can be of size 1 or 2 only. However, in
the actual experiment, groups of any size were allowed to form.
Let yi be individual i’s lottery gain and 1i be an indicator that takes value 1 if i stayed
in the group she joined and 0 if she defected. A subject i in group S earns a payoﬀ as in
equation 1.
Preferences. In our risk pooling experiment, commitment is limited since individuals
can opt out of their sharing groups. We assume that punishments are not possible and the
consequences for individuals who opt out of their risk sharing groups stem only from their
intrinsic motivations, i.e., from feelings of guilt.5 We shall assume that individuals are
heterogenous in terms of both their attitude towards risk and their intrinsic motivations.
We assume that individuals have constant absolute risk aversion ui(c)=− 1
ai exp(−aic).
So their attitude towards risk is captured by one parameter ai that can be either low a or
high ¯ a,0<a< ¯ a, with probability π and 1 − π respectively. This parametric assumption
is important in that it makes the problem much more tractable.
Individuals also diﬀer in terms of their trustworthiness ti that is either low t or high ¯ t.
A proportion γ of individuals are trustworthy. The guilt that an individual i feels from
opting out of a group with j or lying to that person, gij is likely to depend not only on
i’s characteristics but also on the nature of the relationship between i and j. Among close
family and friends, we expect guilt to be higher. To capture this we make the following
assumptions. If i and j are close friends and family members (FF), gij is high enough
that i would never defect on or lie to j irrespective of ti. However, if i and j are relatively
unfamiliar with each other, then i’s type matters. Trustworthy individuals have a level
of guilt high enough that they would not defect on or lie to a stranger. In contrast,
untrustworthy individuals would feel no guilt from lying to or defecting on someone they
are not close to (gij =0i fj is unfamiliar and ti = t).
5If someone opts out of a group, the remaining members could potentially draw some inferences about
defections from their own, shared winnings, but they could never have been certain that someone had opted
out and, in groups of three or more, about whom to suspect of foul play. Moreover, other community
members would not know anything about the defection and neither would other group members who
also defect. So punishments would be hard to design and to enforce and, as a consequence, extrinsic
commitment is very limited.11
The distributions of risk attitudes, trustworthiness and ties of kinship or friendship are
assumed to be independent. Let θi ≡ (ai,t i) be the type of individual i. Unfamiliar
individuals do not know each other’s type, they only know the proportion of people of
each type in the population. We denote as rij the nature of the relation between two
individuals i and j, rij = F if they are close family and friends and rij = U if they are
unfamiliar. Moreover, we assume that everybody knows whether i and j are close friends
or relatives.
Before exploring grouping behaviour, we need to understand the incentives that individ-
uals face and the choices that they make in a given group. To this end, the next section
looks at how individuals’ expected utility and choices are aﬀected by group membership.
3.2. Lottery choice and expected utility.
In this section, we study the choice of lottery and expected utility of individuals who
stay alone and who form a group. We denote as νo
i the expected utility that individual i
has if she stays alone and as ν∗
ij her expected utility in a group with j.
Autarchy. Consider an individual i with risk preference ai who does not form a group.






[ui(b − σ)+ui(b + h(σ))]. (2)
His choice σo(ai) is such that
h
 (σo)exp(−aih(σo)) = exp(aiσo),
which gives him an expected utility νo(ai).
Close family and friends. If individuals j and k are close family or friends, they
would neither lie to nor defect on on each other. Hence, individual i ∈{ j,k} enjoys the12
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(h(σi) − σ−i)) + ui(b +
1
2
(h(σi)+h(σ−i)))], −i  = i ∈{ j,k}.(3)
An equilibrium is a pair of lottery choices (σ∗
j,σ∗
k) such that σ∗
j = argmaxσ vj(σ,σk) and
σ∗
k = argmaxσ vk(σ,σj). Hence, there is a unique equilibrium (σ∗
j,σ∗
k) where, irrespective












ik be the expected utility (3) evaluated at this equilibrium.
Unfamiliar individuals. People who are unfamiliar know neither each other’s risk
preferences nor their trustworthiness. Unfamiliar individuals make announcements to each
other about their risk aversion. Consider individuals j and k who are unfamiliar with each
other, rjk = U. Given their announcements (  aj,  ak), their number of “available” friend and
family members (mj,m k) (more on this below), and the fact that they are willing to group
with each other, they hold beliefs about each other’s types. Let pθ(mi,m −i,  ai,  a−i) denote
the probability with which i ∈{ j,k} is thought of as being of type θ by −i if he expresses
a preference to form a group with her. Notice that, since trustworthy individuals do not
lie, p¯ t,a(mi,m −i,  ai,  a−i)=0f o ra  =   ai, the probability that a trustworthy individual is of
a type, a, other than that which she declares,   ai, is zero.
Hence, for a given pair of announcements   a =(   ai,  a−i) and numbers of available close
friends and relatives m =( mi,m −i), an equilibrium is a vector of lotteries σ whose typical
element σi(θ) is the lottery chosen by individual i ∈{ j,k} if her type is θ, for i ∈{ j,k}.13
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2ui(b + h(σ)) (5)
It is implicitly assumed in the expressions in equations (4) and (5) that untrustworthy
individuals (without guilt) would choose to leave upon winning their lotteries and stay upon
loosing. That this would indeed be their preferred behaviour is proved in Observations 1
and 2 in the Appendix.
There may be more than one equilibrium. In case of multiplicity, we shall select the
equilibrium preferred by the more risk averse trustworthy type.6 The utility νu
i,−i(m,  a)
that i expects from forming a group with −i is then given by (4) if i is trustworthy and
(5) if i is untrustworthy where these expressions are evaluated at the equilibrium.
Some features of individual behaviour of agents paired with unfamiliar individuals is
noteworthy and useful when characterizing grouping behaviour. In particular, we note
that a trustworthy individual with risk aversion ai chooses a lottery that is riskier than
she would choose in autarchy but safer than she would choose in a match with someone
who she knows to be trustworthy, σi(ai,¯ t) ∈ (σo(ai),σ∗(ai)).
We also conjecture that the more risk averse an individual – whether she is trustworthy or
not – the safer her choice of lottery tends to be. Theoretically, this eﬀect could be reversed
6We want to select an equilibrium so that an individual’s expected utility in a group is uniquely deﬁned and
depends only on the group members’ types. The particular selection criterion does not matter. Moreover,
no multiplicity was found in simulated exercises.14
when a trustworthy person expects her partner to choose extremely risky lotteries, but
this never occurred in simulations.
We are now in a position to study individual’s preferred choice of partner, to see how
this may give them incentive to misrepresent their type, and characterize some features of
the stable partitions of individuals in risk sharing groups.
3.3. Grouping.
Consistent beliefs. We assume that every individual has an announcement policy
αi ∈ [0,1] that speciﬁes the probability that she will declare herself to be highly risk averse,
  ai =¯ a, to someone unfamiliar. An individual’s announcement policy is assumed to depend
only on her type so that αi = α(θi). Since trustworthy individuals do not lie, α(¯ t,¯ a)=1
and α(¯ t,a)=0 .
Consider a given partition of the population into groups Q and an announcement vector
  a = {  a1,  a2,...}. An individual is said to be “available” if he is not already matched with
a close friend or relative in Q. Let mi be the number of available close friends or relatives
of i in Q. We denote as Im,m ,  a,  a  the set of individuals i with mi = m and   ai =   a who are
grouped with someone with m  available friends or relatives and announcement   a .
Beliefs p and announcement policies α = {α1,α 2,..} are said to be consistent with a
vector of announcements   a and a partition Q if the following conditions hold:
(1) if   ai =¯ a then αi > 0 and if   ai = a then αi < 1;
(2) p¯ a,¯ t(m,m ,a,  a )=pa,¯ t(m,m ,¯ a,  a )=0 ;
(3) if Im,m ,  a,  a   = ∅ then
pθ(m,m
 ,  a,  a
 )=
Σi∈Im,m ,  a,  a |θi=θ1
Σi∈Im,m ,  a,  a 1
.
Condition (1) requires announcement policies and actual announcements to be consistent.
Individuals can only make announcements that they have a positive probability of making,15
according to their announcement policy. The second condition states that trustworthy in-
dividuals are not believed to lie. Finally, condition (3) requires that one’s beliefs regarding
the type of an unfamiliar person who agrees to form a speciﬁc group corresponds to the
actual proportion of individuals of this type in similar groups. That is, the probability
with which an individual with m available close friends or relatives and an announcement   a
who wants to group with someone with m  close friends or relatives and an announcement
  a  is thought to be of type θ must correspond to the proportion of individuals of type θ
in Im,m ,  a,  a  (individuals who are in similar groups). If some groupings (m,m ,  a,  a ) are
not observed in a partition, consistency does not restrict the beliefs for this hypothetical
grouping.
Why do an individual i’s beliefs regarding a potential partner j depend not only on j’s
announcement and situation but also on her own announcement and situation? This is
because j’s willingness to form a group with i can tell i something about j’s type (see
Chade 2006). For instance, consider a setting in which a trustworthy individual with
high risk aversion would under no circumstance want to group with an unfamiliar person
announcing low risk aversion. If i announces low risk aversion and j announces high risk
aversion and then j wants to group, i should infer that j is untrustworthy.
Stable groups.
Consider a partition Q ≡{ S1,...Sm} of the population into sharing groups of size 1
or 2. This partition along with a vector of announcements   a and a set of beliefs p =
{pθ(m,  a)}∀m,θ,  a generates a vector of utility ν =( ν1,...νn) where νi = νo(ai)i f{i}∈Q,
νi = νu
i,j(  ai,  aj,m i,m j)i f{ij}∈Q and rij = U, and νi = ν∗
ij if {ij}∈Q and rij = F.
Our concept of stability requires beliefs about unfamiliar individuals to be consistent with
people’s announcements and individuals not to want to change their current group mem-
bership and/or announcements. Individuals should prefer their current group to autarchy,
if they are in a group, and to forming a group with another willing individual. When a
pair of individuals i and j who are not together in the initial partition Q consider forming16
a group, we assume that in the resulting partition, denoted as Q+{ij}, the people they were
in groups with (if they were in groups) remain alone.
A partition Q, announcements   a, and associated vector of utility ν are deemed stable if:
[i] there is a vector of announcement policies α so that α and the beliefs p are consistent
with   a and Q;
[ii] there is no individual i so that νo(ai) >ν i
[iii] there is no pair of individuals j and k and announcements (  a 
j,  a 
k)s ot h a tν 
jk >ν j
and ν 
kj ≥ νk where ν 
i −i = v∗
i −i for i,−i ∈{ j,k} if j and k are close friends or family
(rjk = F), and ν 
i −i = vu(  a 
i,  a 
−i,m  
i,m  
−i) if they are unfamiliar (rj,k = U) with m 
i being
the number of available close friends and relative for i,−i ∈{ j,k} in Q+{jk}.
Armed with these deﬁnitions we are now ready to study individual preferences over
group partners and incentives to reveal their risk attitudes.
Preferences over partners.
We ﬁrst show that trustworthy individuals prefer grouping with close friends or family
members with the same risk attitude to any other alternative.
Proposition 1. Trustworthy individuals strictly prefer being in a group with a close friend
or family member who has the same risk preference.
The proof for this result is in the Appendix, but the intuition is simple. The other group
member’s risk aversion aﬀects an individual’s utility only through their choice of lottery.
When co-group members can fully trust each other and know it, they expect to share all
gains. Each’s lottery choice then has exactly the same eﬀect on the other’s group members’
payoﬀ. So close friend or family members with the same preferences will choose the very
lottery that they would want each other to choose. Hence, neither defection nor moral
hazard is an issue and individuals strictly prefer being in a group than alone. Note that
the assumption of no additional transfers is important for this result.7
7As in Sadoulet (2000), Legros and Newman (2004) and Chiappori and Reny (2004) some negative assor-
tative matching would arise with trasferable utility.17
Furthermore, this consideration, together with our consistency requirement, implies that
people who have friends and family available to group with but who nevertheless seek
to group with unfamiliar individuals are highly likely to be and to be believed to be
untrustworthy. A trustworthy individual would never defect on anybody, but faces the risk
of being the victim of defection if he groups with an unfamiliar individual. In contrast,
untrustworthy individuals may be tempted to group with an unfamiliar individual and
thereby have the option of defecting guiltlessly rather than grouping with a close friend or
relative on whom they would not defect.
Suppose that trustworthy individuals always prefer to match with friends or family mem-
bers, even of diﬀerent risk preference, rather than remaining alone (v∗(a,a ) ≥ vo(a)) for all
a  = a . Then, a set of consistent beliefs would hold that someone with m>0 (that is, with
available friends and relatives to group with) who, nevertheless, considers grouping with
an unfamiliar person, is untrustworthy with probability 1. On the other hand if, for some
risk preference, being alone is preferred to grouping with a close friend or family member
of diﬀerent risk preferences, v∗(a,a ) <v o(a) for some a  = a , then there is a positive prob-
ability that someone unfamiliar with m>0 is a trustworthy individuals whose available
friends and relatives have diﬀerent risk aversion to them. However, this probability is still
going to be smaller than for an unfamiliar person with the same announcement and fewer
available friends or relative.
With these beliefs, what happens if the assortative matching within close friends and
family members leaves pairs of them with diﬀerent risk attitude? If forming a group with
each other is preferable to remaining alone, then they would do so since they would not
be trusted at all by unknown individuals. Otherwise if remaining alone is preferred by
one of them, they would most likely both stay alone. This is because they would be less
trusted than other unfamiliar individuals without available close friend or relative, and
therefore could only group with someone else in a similar situation and who is likely to be
untrustworthy. In most cases, autarchy will be preferable.18
Next, we analyze the preferences for diﬀerent types of co-group members among unfa-
miliar individuals. That is, we ask the question: given that somebody forms a group with
an unfamiliar individual, with whom would she prefer to group?
Incentives for truth telling.
Consider a situation where truth telling prevails, that is all individuals announce their
actual risk aversion. Would trustworthy people prefer unfamiliar individuals with the
same risk preference as themselves? It is not clear. Assume that a trustworthy person
could choose her co-group member’s lottery as well as her own. On the one hand, if he’s
untrustworthy she would like him to make as safe a choice as possible. This tends to favor
individuals who are more risk averse than her. On the other hand if he’s trustworthy,
she would like him to choose lottery σ∗(a). This is a more risky choice than the choice
that her partner would make if he is trustworthy and has risk preference a as he would
want to ‘protect’ himself against the possibility that she is not trustworthy. This tends to
make individuals that are less risk averse than her attractive as co-group member. Hence,
overall, among unfamiliar others, individuals would not necessarily prefer people with the
same risk preferences as themselves.
To be sure, this does not rule out assortative matching. If a trustworthy person with low
risk aversion prefers a safer vector of lotteries σ−i to σ 
−i > σ−i then a high risk aversion
person does too. This tells us that, in most case, when a low risk aversion person would
rather group with a high risk aversion person, a high risk aversion would rather group with
a high risk aversion person. Similarly, if a high risk aversion person would rather group
with a low risk aversion person, in general a low risk aversion person would too. Hence,
assortative matching would arise.
However, when individuals prefer partners of diﬀerent risk aversion from themselves among
unfamiliar individuals, we need to worry about the incentives for truth-telling. Indeed,
untrustworthy individuals may choose to misreport their risk preference. As a result,19
grouping among unfamiliar individuals is less attractive and grouping will be mixed in
terms of risk preferences. The following Section illustrates these eﬀects.
3.4. Examples of stable partitions.
In this Section, we present two numerical examples of stable partitions that illustrate our
earlier ﬁndings. For both examples, we shall consider a discrete number of lotteries – the 6
lotteries used in the actual experiment – and assume that half the population has a low risk
aversion a =0 .02 and the other half has a high risk aversion ¯ a =0 .05 so that in autarchy
they would choose gamble 3 and 2 respectively. In both examples, grouping with a close
friend or relative of any risk preference is always preferred to autarchy. Hence, we set
beliefs so that individuals with available close friends or relatives who seek to group with
unfamiliar people are believed to be untrustworthy. It follows that in a stable partition,
there will be no individual with available close friends or family members grouping with
unfamiliar individuals. Note that close friends and relatives who are already in groups
with other close friends and relatives are counted as available. Whenever possible, close
friends and family members with the same risk aversion group with each other, and if
they have low (high) risk aversion select gamble 5 (3). What happens among unfamiliar
individuals depends on the proportion of untrustworthy in the population and diﬀers across
the examples.
The proportion of trustworthy individuals, γ, is assumed to be 85% in example 1 while
in example 2, we set γ = 50%.
Example 1. Consider a stable partition with truth-telling. In this case, all individuals
with high risk aversion ¯ a (whether trustworthy or untrustworthy ) in a group select gamble
3, while trustworthy individuals with low risk aversion a grouping with unfamiliar individ-
uals select gamble 4 and untrustworthy individuals with low risk aversion a grouping with
unfamiliar individuals select gamble 5.
Since, the probability of an untrustworthy partner is only 15% this has little impact
on who individuals choose to group with and individuals prefer grouping with unfamiliar
individuals to autarchy. Trustworthy individuals of all risk preferences prefer to group20
assortatively and untrustworthy individuals have no incentive to lie about their risk pref-
erence.
Hence, assortative matching among both family and friends and unfamiliar and truth-
telling are stable in this example.
Example 2. This second example is identical to the ﬁrst except that the proportion
of untrustworthy individuals is much larger: they constitute half the population. Let’s
assume truth-telling to start with, that is individuals announce their real risk preferences.
In all groups of unfamiliar individuals, low risk aversion individuals would select gamble
4 and high risk aversion individuals would select gamble 3. Now, trustworthy individuals
with low risk aversion would prefer grouping with individuals with high risk aversion.
Since individuals with high risk aversion prefer each other to people with low risk aversion,
this would not be an option. With assortative matching among unfamiliar individuals,
individuals with high risk aversion would form groups while individuals with low risk
aversion would choose autarchy. Would this be a stable partition?
No. Untrustworthy individuals with low risk aversion would have an incentive to pretend
to be of high risk aversion in order to match with a high risk aversion person. Hence a
stable partition will involve some misrepresentation of risk preferences.
A stable partition in this example consists of unfamiliar individuals announcing a high
risk aversion grouping with each other while others remain alone, and 10.36% of the un-
trustworthy with low risk aversion pretending to have high risk aversion. Hence, groups of
unfamiliar individuals with diﬀerent risk aversion form while we have assortative matching
among close friends and family members.
3.5. Predictions.
The theoretical model and the examples discussed above support a number of hypotheses
that may be tested using the data from the experiment.
(1) Among close family and friends grouping is relatively commonplace and strongly as-
sortative with respect to risk attitudes.21
(2) Among unfamiliar individuals grouping is relatively rare and may or may not be as-
sortative with respect to risk attitudes. The lack of trust among unfamiliar individuals
perturbs preference orderings across diﬀerent types of co-group member leading to some
preferring to group with individuals exhibiting risk preferences that are diﬀerent to their
own. In this case, untrustworthy individuals have an incentive to lie about their risk
attitudes and this prevents assortative matching among unfamiliar.
(3) The likelihood that an individual will group with someone who is unfamiliar to them
declines as the number of close family and friends present increases. This is because, as this
number rises, the likelihood of ﬁnding close family and friends with similar risk attitudes
rises and because an individual who chooses not to group with close family and friends is
more likely to be and be believed to be untrustworthy by others.
We are aware that some of the assumptions underlying the model are very strong. Most
importantly, in the experiment, groups could be of any size, while in the model only
groups of size two were allowed. We consider this mismatch to be justiﬁable as, had we
restricted the experimental subjects to groups of two, we may have introduced an element
of artiﬁciality that would have distracted the subjects from the underlying nature of the
choices they were being asked to make.8 And if the theoretical model is extended to larger
groups, both tractability and the ease with which clear predictions can be made rapidly
declines, although we believe that the intuition would carry through.
Secondly, it is unlikely that close friends and family members always trust each other
and that there is a stark cutoﬀ between close friends and family and unfamiliar individuals
both in terms of the level of guilt they would feel if they defaulted and with respect to
the accuracy with which they can form beliefs about each other. Again, this assumption
is made for tractability reasons and we will investigate the possibility that guilt varies
continuously with social distance in the empirical analysis below.
8In Zimbabwe, subjects playing a version of the game in which people could form groups of at most two
likened (in post play discussions) the game to a dance or being required to walk in pairs when at school,
whereas they likened the current game to the forming of funeral societies and various forms of cooperative.22
4. Empirical Strategy
4.1. Empirical speciﬁcations.
To test these predictions, we combine the data from the experiment with the network
data on friendship and kinship and survey data on the individuals’ characteristics. To test
the three predictions discussed above, we apply the dyadic analysis techniques developed
in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and Arcand and Fafchamps (2008).
In dyadic analyses each possible pair or dyad of individuals in a dataset is treated as
an observation. Thus, in the current context, a dyadic approach allows us to investigate
who chooses to group with whom during the second round of the experiment and how
those choices are aﬀected by both any pre-existing relationships between dyad members
and their individual preferences and characteristics.
Let mij = 1 if individual i forms a risk pooling group with individual j, and 0 otherwise.
The network matrix M ≡ [mij] is symmetrical since mij = mji by construction and, as
noted by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), this implies that the explanatory variables must
enter the regression model in symmetric form. So, to test our ﬁrst two predictions we start
by estimating the following model:








j|)+sij + uij (6)
where fij indicates that i and j are close family or friends, l1
i denotes the gamble chosen
by individual i in the ﬁrst round — our proxy for their risk preferences, sij is a vector of
session (and municipality) ﬁxed eﬀects, uij is the error term and β1 to β3 are the coeﬃcients
to be estimated.
Regression model (6) can be used to test predictions 1 and 2. In particular, a signiﬁcantly
positive coeﬃcient β1 can be taken as evidence that close family and friends are more likely
to group together. The regressor |l1
i −l1
j| is the diﬀerence in gamble choices in Round 1, our
proxy for diﬀerences in risk attitudes. A signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient β2 can be taken
as evidence of assortative grouping based on risk attitudes among unfamiliar dyads. A
signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient β3 can be taken as evidence that close family and friends23
assort more strongly with respect to risk attitudes than those who are unfamiliar to one
another. And the signiﬁcance of the sum of β2 and β3 tells us whether this assorting is an
important determinant of grouping decisions among close family and friends.
Of course, diﬀerences in risk attitudes and social proximity are unlikely to be the only
determinants of group formation. Other individual and dyadic characteristics and envi-
ronmental factors may also aﬀect the group formation process and, only when these are
controlled for in the model, can we be sure that the observed results are not due to omitted
variable bias. Therefore, to test the robustness of any results obtained by estimating the
model above, we expand it to include a number of additional controls and more information
regarding the nature of the relationships of friendship and kinship:













j)+sij + uij (7)
where zi is a vector of other potentially relevant characteristics of individual i and f1ij
to fhij are reﬁnements of the family and friends variable indicating whether a friendship
or a kinship was recognized and whether the tie was reciprocally identiﬁed. β4 to β6 are
additional coeﬃcients to be estimated.
Among the reﬁnements to the family and friends indicator variable, we expect those
identifying reciprocally recognized ties to bear larger, positive coeﬃcients. Further, and
more importantly, if similarities in risk preferences are associated with genetic or social
closeness, the inclusion of these controls could reduce or eliminate the signiﬁcance of the
interaction term. Put another way, apparent assorting on risk attitudes among close family
and friends could be due to similarities in risk preferences being associated with the degree
of closeness and it is only by controlling for that closeness that we can isolate the pure
assorting eﬀect.
While our model does not have any predictions relating to β4, it is worth noting that
signiﬁcantly negative elements in this vector can be taken as evidence of assorting on
individual characteristics other than risk attitudes, i.e. the tendency for more similar24
individuals to group (Jackson (2008), Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2008)). Signiﬁcant
elements in β5 identify individual characteristics that are associated with an increased
likelihood of group formation and the formation of larger groups. To see why, suppose
that individuals with a large value of z form larger groups. This implies that E[mij]i sa n
increasing function of zi + zj – and hence that β5 is positive. And, by the same logic, a
signiﬁcantly negative β6 can be taken as evidence that less risk averse individuals are less
likely to enter into risk sharing groups.
The dyadic models are estimated using a logit. When estimating the models it is essential
to correct the standard errors for non-independence across observations. Non-independence
arises in part because residuals from dyadic observations involving the same individual i
are correlated, negatively or positively, with each other. Standard errors can be corrected
for this type of non-independence by clustering either by dyad as proposed by Fafchamps
and Gubert (2007), or by municipality (and, hence, experimental session). The second
approach corrects for possible non-independence not only within dyadic pairs sharing a
common element but also across all the dyads participating in the same experimental
session. Because we have data from 70 municipal sessions we are able to apply the second,
more conservative approach. In addition, we include municipality ﬁxed eﬀects to control for
all municipality-level unobservables, including possible variations in the level of background
or generalized trust.
The estimation of models (6) and (7) allows us to test predictions 1 and 2. To test
the third prediction, namely that the probability of two individuals that are unfamiliar
belonging to the same group depends negatively on the number of family and friends
each member of the dyad has available, we restrict the sample to the dyads of unfamiliar
individuals and introduce the number of family and friends available to the dyad as the
additional variable of interest in the estimation.
4.2. Identifying close family and friends.
Before we can estimate models (6) and (7), we need to decide how to identify dyads that
are made up of close family or friends. Recall that in the theory this label was applied25
to pairs who had considerable information about each other and could trust each other.
What type and degree of closeness is required for this to be true is an empirical question.
Our data can support three alternative deﬁnitions of close family and friends. First, we can
treat as close family and friends all dyads in which one or both members indicated a tie of
friendship or kinship, the assumption being that all ties of friendship and kinship are close
enough. Second, we can treat as close family and friends dyads in which both members
indicated a tie of friendship or kinship, the idea being that the reciprocated recognition of
the tie is an indication of closeness. And third, we can treat as close family and friends all
dyads in which one or both members indicated a tie of friendship or kinship and the dyad
members’ dwellings are geographically proximate, the idea being that only geographically
proximate family and friends will have suﬃcient information about one another to know




The data generated by the experiment is presented in Table 3. In this table, the ﬁrst
and second columns contain the proportions, means, and corresponding standard errors
for all 2,512 participants and the third and fourth columns present the same statistics but
for the sample upon which the dyadic regression analysis was ultimately performed.
The modal gamble choice, Gamble 4, was chosen by 29 percent of the participants in both
rounds of the experiment. However, there is evidence of a shift towards more risk-taking in
the second round: 35 percent chose either Gamble 5 or 6 in the second round as compared
to 26 percent in the ﬁrst round. Eighty-six percent of the experimental participants chose
to join a risk-sharing group and on average chose four co-group members. The mode of two
co-group members was selected by 19 percent of the sample, with one co-group member,
i.e., groups of two, being almost as prevalent (18 percent).
Eight percent of the participants subsequently defected, six percent after ﬁnding out
that they had won their gambles and two percent after ﬁnding out that they had lost26
their gambles. Note that since individuals do not know their co-group members’ gamble
realizations before deciding whether to stay in or defect, it can be rational for some people
to leave having lost their own gamble. Indeed, an individual who is very risk averse at
low levels of consumption – for instance because of subsistence constraints – but not at
higher levels of consumption may be happy to form a group with a trustworthy, risk loving
person and leave the group when loosing. If he were to stay in the group upon losing his
gamble, he would run the risk to have to share his already small gain with his partner. We
illustrate this by an example in Appendix A.
5.2. Dyadic characteristics.
We report the proportions, means and standard deviations for the dyadic variables in
Table 4. Here, we focus on the sample of 87,038 within session dyads upon which the
dyadic analysis is ultimately performed.9
Thus, we see that nine percent of all the possible within-municipality dyads grouped
together. This proportion is low despite the large proportion of individuals joining groups
because average group size was small. So, the dependent variable mij in (6) and (7) equals
one in nine percent of cases and zero in 91 percent of cases.
The average diﬀerence in gamble choices was two. This diﬀerence corresponds to, for
example, one member of the dyad choosing the modal Gamble 4 and the other choosing
either Gamble 2 or Gamble 6. In nine percent of dyads the diﬀerence in gamble choices
was four or ﬁve, indicating that either one of the dyad members chose Gamble 1 and the
other Gamble 5 or 6 or one chose Gamble 6 and the other Gamble 1 or 2.
In ten percent of the dyads one or both of the members recognized that they shared
a tie of kinship or friendship. However, kinship between dyads is extremely rare, with a
kinship tie being recognized by both individuals in less than half a percent of dyads and
being recognized by one individual in an additional three quarters of a percent of dyads.
9The experiment involved between 11 and 90 individuals per municipality or session. Thus, there are
between 110 and 8,010 dyads per municipality. Inter-municipality dyads could not group together because
they were not present in the same session. So, they are not included in the sample.27
Friendships are less rare, being mutually recognized in over two percent of dyads and by
one individual in a further seven percent of dyads. It is worth noting that, while these
proportions are very small, because of the size of our dyadic sample, they relate to large
numbers of observations: kinships were mutually recognized by 396 dyads and by one
member of a further 626 dyads; and friendships were mutually recognized by 2,132 dyads
and by one member of a further 6,170 dyads.10
We do not have data on the precise location of the dwelling of each of the experimental
subjects. However, we do know whether they live in the small town or village in which the
municipal government is located or in the surrounding rural hinterland. Further, because
the sample was clustered and the clustering was captured in the data, we know which of
those living in the rural hinterland are geographically proximate to one another and which
not. In the following analysis we treat dyads in which both live in the municipal centre and
dyads in which both live in the same rural cluster as geographically proximate. Applying
this deﬁnition to the family and friends dyads (reciprocated and unreciprocated ties) we
ﬁnd that about half are geographically proximate. So, ﬁve percent of the full sample of
dyads are geographically proximate family and friends. Table 4 also presents the average
diﬀerences in and sums of individual characteristics for the dyads.11
5.3. Graphical analysis.
Before moving to the regression analysis, it is useful to investigate predictions 1 and 2
graphically. Figure 2 shows how the proportion of dyads choosing to group together varies
with the diﬀerence in their ﬁrst round gamble choices. Three graphs are presented, each
associated with a diﬀerent possible division of the full sample into two sub-samples, the
ﬁrst relating to one of the deﬁnitions of close family and friends described above and the
second relating to all the other dyads in the full sample.
In the top graph, close family and friends are deﬁned as all those dyads in which one
or both members recognized a tie of friendship or kinship. In the middle graph, close
10In social network data it is not unusual for only one member of a dyad to recognize a tie.
11We do not report the diﬀerence in household headship and the number of household heads and neither
do we use these variables in the dyadic regressions as headship and gender are highly correlated in our
sample (Chi-squared statistic = 401).28
family and friends are deﬁned as all those dyads in which a tie of friendship or kinship
was reciprocally recognized. In the bottom graph, close family and friends are deﬁned as
geographically proximate dyads in which one or both members recognized a tie of friendship
or kinship.
The top graph suggests that dyads within which one or both recognized a tie of kinship or
friendship are more likely to group than dyads within which no tie of kinship or friendship
exists. It also suggests that there may be assorting on risk attitudes among family and
friends.
The middle graph suggests that dyads within which either both recognized a tie of
kinship or friendship or one recognized a tie of friendship and the other kinship are even
more likely to end up in the same risk sharing group. In addition, assorting on risk attitudes
among these close, i.e. reciprocated tie, family and friends is more apparent.
Finally, the bottom graph suggests that geographically proximate dyads in which one or
both recognized a tie of kinship or friendship fall somewhere between the preceding two in
terms of the likelihood of them ending up in the same risk sharing group, but appear as, if
not more, likely to group assortatively on risk attitudes than those sharing a reciprocated
tie as deﬁned in the preceding paragraph.
5.4. Dyadic Logit analysis. The signiﬁcance and robustness of the patterns identiﬁed in
the graphical analysis can be investigated more formally by estimating the dyadic models
described in Section 4. Table 5 presents the results we obtain when estimating equation
(6). Each column of the Table corresponds to a diﬀerent deﬁnition of fij, the variable
that identiﬁes ‘close family and friends’. In column 1, fij takes the value 1 if one or both
members of the dyad recognized a tie, friendship or kinship. In column 2, fij takes the
value 1 if both members of the dyad recognized a tie, friendship or kinship. And in column
3, fij takes the value 1 if the members of the dyad are geographically proximate and one
or both members of the dyad recognized a tie, friendship or kinship. Municipality ﬁxed-
eﬀects are included in all speciﬁcations and reported standard errors have been adjusted
by clustering at the municipality level. In the tables, rather than the coeﬃcients of the29
logit model we report marginal eﬀects. Therefore each number describes by how much the
probability that a dyad is part of a group changes when changing the relevant variable by
one unit.
We see that all three deﬁnitions of fij are associated with a signiﬁcantly higher likelihood
of grouping together.12 In particular, a dyad ij is 20% more likely to be part of the same
risk sharing group if at least one of them identiﬁes the other as ‘family or friend’. When we
restrict the deﬁnition of family and friend to dyads where both individuals recognize each
other as such, the estimates in column 2 imply that the probability of ij being in the same
group goes up by 40%. In column 3, where fij is one if ij live in the same neighborhood
and at least one of them identiﬁes the other as family or friend, the probability of group
membership goes up by 30%.
Furthermore, the signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on the interaction terms in each of the
speciﬁcations indicates that among close family and friends, irrespective of how the sub-
sample is deﬁned, group formation is assortative with respect to risk attitudes. However,
among the relatively unfamiliar, assorting on risk attitudes is not observed.13 Finally,
F-tests indicate that the sum of the coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence in gamble choice and
the interaction term is signiﬁcantly negative, although as we might expect looking at the
coeﬃcients, the levels of signiﬁcance vary markedly, ﬁve percent in the ﬁrst two columns
and 0.1 percent in the third.
These ﬁndings suggest that close friendship and kinship is associated with a higher
likelihood of grouping and more assorting on risk attitudes and that this ﬁnding is robust
across three diﬀerent deﬁnitions of close family and friends. However, we need to test
12In the theoretical model, this prediction derived from the assumptions that friends and kin knew each
other’s type and would never default on each other. These assumptions are supported by the data. In
groups of two geographically proximate friends and family never default, while in 11% of unfamiliar groups
of two one defaults and in 1 percent both default. In larger groups defaults are lower the higher the density
of the friends and family network, although the eﬀect declines with group size. See Appendix Table A2.
13We ﬁnd limited evidence of assortative grouping with respect to risk attitudes among relatively unfamiliar
dyads. Replacing ‘Diﬀerence in gamble choice (round 1)’ with a variable that equals 1 if that diﬀerence
is greater than 3 and zero otherwise returns a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient. However, the signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcient on the interaction term in the model in column 1 is lost. See Appendix Table A3.30
whether these ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of other controls and the disaggregated
family and friends indicators in accordance with speciﬁcation (7).14
The additional controls render the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms in Columns 1
and 2 of Table 5 insigniﬁcant, while those in Column 3 are pretty much unchanged. For
brevity, in Table 6 we present the estimates for model (8) applying only the geographically
proximate family and friends deﬁnition of fij. 15
The ﬁrst column in Table 6 presents the estimates relating to model (7). ‘Geograph-
ically proximate friends and family’ continues to bear a signiﬁcant, positive coeﬃcient,
which implies an increase in the probability of participating in the same group of 5%,
which is much lower than what we observed in the speciﬁcation without control. How-
ever, the interaction between this variable and the ‘Diﬀerence in gamble choice’ variable
continues to bear a signiﬁcant, negative coeﬃcient. In addition, reciprocated friendship
ties bear a large positive coeﬃcient. The coeﬃcients on reciprocated kinship ties and ties
viewed as friendships by one party and kinships by the other are also positive and large.
Unreciprocated ties bear smaller but nevertheless highly signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients.16
In column 2 we present an estimated model for the sub-sample of dyads that are geo-
graphically proximate family and friends. In this model the coeﬃcient on the ‘Diﬀerence
in gamble choice’ variable is negative and highly signiﬁcant and we see that, among ge-
ographically proximate family and friends, reciprocated friendship ties and reciprocated
14The disaggregated family and friends indicators control for the possibility that dyads sharing ties of
close friendship or kinship may be more alike with respect to risk attitudes. Another way of exploring this
possibility is to regress the dyadic diﬀerence in ﬁrst round gamble choice on each of our indicators of close
family and friends and on the disaggregated friends and family indicators. Doing this we ﬁnd that none
of our deﬁnitions of close family and friends are associated with signiﬁcantly more similar risk attitudes,
although mutually recognised friendships are. None of the results reported here are signiﬁcantly altered
by taking dyads with mutually recognised friendships out of the analysis.
15The proportions, means, and standard deviations for all the sub-samples deﬁned and explored during
the analysis are presented in Appendix Table A1. The model estimations relating to fij deﬁned as all
friends and family can be found in Appendix Table A4. And the model estimations relating to fij deﬁned
as dyads in which both members recognized a friendship or kinship can be found in Appendix Table A5.
16To check whether these ﬁndings are driven purely by who chooses to group with anyone rather than who
chooses to group with whom, we reran all of the estimates in Table 6 on the sub-sample of dyads in which
both members chose to group with at least one other person, though not necessarily the other member of
that dyad. The results, presented in Appendix Table A5, are almost indistinguishable indicating that the
ﬁndings reported in Table 6 are not driven by the decision to group irrespective of with whom.31
ties that are recognized as a friendship by one and kinship by the other are particularly
strongly associated with grouping.
In column 3 we present an estimated model for the sub-sample of geographically distant
family and friends and unrelated dyads. Here, the coeﬃcient on the ‘Diﬀerence in gamble
choice’ variable is insigniﬁcant, while we see that, ties of friendship and kinship remain
important even when they are not also backed up by geographic proximity.
Before moving away from Table 6, a number of other signiﬁcant ﬁndings are worthy of
note. Grouping is assortative on gender and household consumption among geographically
distant family and friends and unrelated dyads, but not among geographically proximate
family and friends. Also among geographically distant family and friends and unrelated
dyads, municipal centre dwellers and rural hinterland dwellers tend not to group with each
other, while the latter tend to engage in more grouping than the former, and those who
received high winnings in the ﬁrst round were less likely to group. Finally, in both sub-
samples those who received high and low winnings in the ﬁrst round were less likely to
group together.
Finally, as a ﬁrst look at our third theoretical prediction, unfamiliar dyads are less likely
to group together the more close family and friends they have available to group with,
we re-estimate the model for the sub-sample of geographically distant family and friends
and unrelated dyads, while introducing three additional variables: the number of close
(geographically proximate) friends and family options that the members of the dyad had
when choosing whether and how to group; the interaction between this and the ‘Diﬀerence
in gamble choice’ variable; and, as a control, the diﬀerence in the number of close friends
and family options that the members of the dyad had. Table 7 shows that the ‘Number of
geographically proximate family and friends options’ bears a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient
as predicted.17 However, while the coeﬃcient on the interaction between this variable and
the diﬀerence in gamble choice’ variable is negative, it is insigniﬁcant.
17This variables also bears a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient when included in the estimation on the sub-
sample of dyads who are geographically proximate family and friends. However, it is less signiﬁcant. This
is consistent with more options implying a reduced likelihood of grouping with any particular one.32
6. Conclusion
Our objective in this paper was to investigate the eﬀects of risk attitudes and social
networks on group formation in a risk pooling experiment.
A simple theoretical model in which individuals are heterogenous in terms of their risk
attitudes and guilt levels and can form pairs to pool risk, led to the following predictions
about who would choose to group with whom within the experiment: close friends and
family are more likely to group together; among close family and friends, individuals with
similar risk attitudes are more likely to group together; and the more friends and family
member one has the less likely one is to group with an unfamiliar person.
A dyadic analysis based on experimental data on risk attitudes and risk pooling group
formation, social network data, and data from a survey provides evidence supporting
these predictions. Among close family and friends grouping is relatively commonplace and
strongly assortative with respect to risk attitudes. Among unfamiliar individuals grouping
is much less common and is, at most, weakly assortative with respect to risk attitudes.
Individuals are less likely to group with someone who is unfamiliar the more close family
and friends are available. Finally, the analysis indicated that geographical proximity is
the dimension of closeness that matters in this context. This is consistent with the notion
that geographical proximity leads to more interaction and that in turn leads to greater
knowledge about the trustworthiness of others.
Thus, we conclude that when risk pooling agreements are enforced only by intrinsic
motivations, bonds of friendship and kinship are important. They facilitate information
ﬂows and promote trustworthy behaviour and thereby support group formation and allow
individuals to construct groups in which incentives are aligned and the problem of moral
hazard is minimized. When no such bonds exist, individuals have to rely on their beliefs
about how trustworthy people are in general and endeavour to interpret the signals people
send in combination with the context in which they ﬁnd themselves. The consequence is
less group formation, less assorting and, consequentially lower utility.33
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Geog. prox. family& friends (4,466)
Other (82,052)
36Table 1: Experimental subjects
Obs. Mean/Prop s.d. Obs Mean/Prop s.d
Female 2420 87.52% 2321 87.20%
.
Age (years) 2396 41.78 11.39 2321 41.72 11.37
Education (years) 2397 3.70 3.12 2321 3.70 3.13
Household head 2423 28.64% 2321 28.78%
Married 2420 77.11% 2321 77.73%
Lives in municipal centre 2478 33.86% 2321 34.38%
Household consumption ('000 Pesos/month) 2478 433.64 254.90 2321 427.29 249.91
Log household consumption per month 2478 12.82 0.58 2321 12.81 0.58
Household size 2452 7.34 3.19 2321 7.27 3.13
No. of kin recognized in session  2506 0.316 0.662 2321 0.322 0.671
No. of friends recognized in session 2506 2.391 2.572 2321 2.421 2.575
Full Sample
Sample used in dyadic 
analysis 
Table 2: Gamble choices
Gamble 
Choice













Gamble 1 3,000 3,000 3,000 0 Extreme infinity to 7.49
Gamble 2 2,700 5,700 4,200 2,121 Severe 7.49 to 1.73
Gamble 3 2,400 7,200 4,800 3,394 Intermediate 1.73 to 0.81
Gamble 4 1,800 9,000 5,400 5,091 Moderate 0.81 to 0.46
Gamble 5 1,000 11,000 6,000 7,071 Slight-neutral 0.46 to 0.00
Gamble 6 0 12,000 6,000 8,485 Neutral-negative 0 to -ve infinity
Table 3: Experimental data
Mean/Prop s.d. Mean/Prop s.d
Gamble choice in round 1
   Gamble 1 (safe option) 8.74% 8.75%
   Gamble 
.
2 17.76% 17.66%
   Gamble 3 18.20% 18.31%
   Gamble 4 29.29% 29.17%
   Gamble 5 11.25% 11.12%
   Gamble 6 (riskiest) 14.76% 14.99%
Won gamble in 1st round 54.71% 54.55%
Winnings in 1st round ('000 Pesos) 5.842 3.832 5.835 3.838
Joined a group 86.23% 86.90%
Number of co-group members 4.128 5.760 3.618 3.863
Gamble choice in round 2
   Gamble 1 (safe option) 6.03% 5.99%
   Gamble 2 12.85% 12.76%
   Gamble 3 17.68% 17.76%
   Gamble 4 28.94% 28.75%
   Gamble 5 17.21% 17.33%
   Gamble 6 (riskiest) 17.29% 17.41%
Won gamble in 2nd round 57.72% 57.72%
Reneged… 8.02% 8.19%
   having won gamble 6.26% 6.42%
   having lost gamble 1.76% 1.77%
Winnings in 2nd round ('000 Pesos) 6.134 4.046 6.133 4.052
Observations 2506 2321
Full Sample
Sample used in 
dyadic analysis 
37Table 4: Dyadic variables
Dyadic variable Mean/Prop s.d.   
Joined same group in round 2 9.21%
Difference in gamble choice (round 1) 1.639 1.265
Sum of gamble choices (round 1) 7.179 2.123
Friends and family: One or both recognized friendship or kinship 10.49%
Both recognized friendship 2.43%
Both recognized kinship 0.45%
One recognized friendship, other kinship 0.18%
One recognized friendship 6.90%
One recognized kinship 0.53%
Strangers 89.51%
Geographically proximate friends and family 5.16%
One lives in the municipal centre, one not 30.95%
Different genders  20.54%
Difference in age (years) 12.404 9.682
Difference in education (years) 3.235 2.770
Difference in marital status 34.68%
Difference in household consumption ('000s Pesos/month) 232.840 227.244
Difference in log household consumption per month 0.589 0.489
Difference in household size 3.111 2.907
Difference in round 1 winnings ('000 Pesos) 4.182 3.213
Number who live in the municipal centre 0.715 0.780
Number of females 1.750 0.482
Sum of ages (years) 83.673 16.012
Sum of education (years) 7.352 4.512
Number married 1.550 0.592
Sum of household consumption ('000s Pesos/month) 850.188 359.942
Sum of log household consumption per month 25.621 0.845
Sum of household sizes 14.568 4.529
Sum of round 1 winnings ('000s Pesos) 11.708 5.484
Observations 86518
All dyads
Table 5: Dyadic analysis of assortative matching on risk attitudes 
   1    2     3
Difference in gamble choice (round 1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Friends and family 0.204 ***
(0.031)
Diff. in gamble choice x Friends and family -0.005 *
(0.003)
Friends and family, reciprocated ties only 0.412 ***
(0.050)
Diff. in gamble choice x Friends and family, reciprocated ties -0.008 *
(0.004)
Geograpically proximate friends and family 0.295 ***
(0.049)
Diff. in gamble choice x Geog. proximate friends and family -0.012 ***
(0.004)
Municipality dummy variables included yes yes yes
Number of observations 86518 86518 86518
Pseudo R-suqared 0.143 0.140 0.131
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account of non-
independence within municipalities by clustering; *** - sig. at 1% level; ** - sig. at 5% level; * - sig. at 10% level.
All dyads
38Table 6: Dyadic analysis focusing on geographically proximate family and friends as the high trust dyads
All dyads Other dyads
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Difference in gamble choice (round 1) 4.45e
-4 -0.021 *** -4.63e
-5
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
Geograpically proximate friends and family 0.048 ***
(0.019)
Diff. in gamble choice 1 x Geog. prox.  -0.011 ***
friends and family (0.003)
Both recognised friendship 0.362 *** 0.298 *** 0.358 ***
(0.034) (0.065) (0.042)
Both recognised kinship 0.259 *** 0.302 *** 0.180 ***
(0.047) (0.095) (0.055)
One recognised friendship, other kinship 0.254 *** 0.211 * 0.257 ***
(0.066) (0.112) (0.095)
One recognised friendship 0.087 *** 0.019 0.084 ***
(0.015) (0.059) (0.015)
One recognised kinship 0.090 *** 0.051
(0.034) (0.038)
One lives in municipal centre, other not -0.013 *** -0.011 ***
(0.004) (0.003)
Different genders  -0.012 ** -0.065 -0.011 ***
(0.005) (0.056) (0.004)










Difference in marital status 0.002 0.036 0.001
(0.003) (0.029) (0.003)
Difference in log household consumption -0.007 ** -0.030 -0.005 *
(0.003) (0.030) (0.003)
Difference in household size 0.001 -0.004 0.001
(0.001) (0.006) (4.90e
-4)




Sum of gamble choices (round 1) 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Number who live in municipal centre -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 **
(0.003) (0.018) (0.003)
Number of females -0.005 -0.034 -0.005
(0.005) (0.044) (0.004)
Sum of ages 8.09e












Number who are married 0.004 0.081 ** 0.002
(0.003) (0.033) (0.003)
Sum log household consumption -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.019) (0.002)










Municipality dummy variables included yes yes yes
Number of observations 86518 4440
# 82052
Pseudo R-suqared 0.160 0.183 0.139
Geographically proximate 
friends and family
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account of non-independence within
municipalities by clustering; *** - sig. at 1% level; ** - sig. at 5% level; * - sig. at 10% level; 
# - 4 additional municipalities were 
dropped from this regression because, in one, all of the dyads joined the same group and, in three, none of the dyads joined the
same group.
39     1
Difference in gamble choice (round 1) -0.001
(0.001)
Number of geog. prox friends and family options -0.003 *
(0.002)




Difference in friends and family options -3.78e
-4
(0.002)
Both recognised friendship 0.359 ***
(0.042)
Both recognised kinship 0.181 ***
(0.056)
One recognised friendship, other kinship 0.260 ***
(0.095)
One recognised friendship 0.086 ***
(0.015)
One recognised kinship 0.051 *
(0.037)
Other control variables included# yes
Municipality dummy variables included yes
Number of observations 82052
Pseudo R-suqared 0.140
Table 7: Dyadic analysis of geographically distant family and friends and unrelated dyads and 
including friends and family options
Geographically distant friends 
and family and unrelated dyads
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account 
of non-independence within municipalities by clustering; *** - sig. at 1% level; ** - sig. at 5% level; * - 
sig. at 10% level. # - Controls included: One lives in municipal centre, one not, Different genders, 
Difference in age, Difference in years of schooling, Difference in marital status, Difference in log 
household consumption, Difference in household size, Difference in round 1 winnings, Sum of gamble 
choices, Number who live in municipal centre, Number of females, Sum of ages, Sum of years of 
schooling, Number who are married, Sum log household consumption, Sum of household sizes, Sum 
of round 1 winnings.
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Appendix: Material not for publication
A. Deviations upon loosing one’s gamble.
This Appendix shows that since individuals do not know the other’s realization before
deciding whether to stay or not, it may be rational for them to leave their group after having
lost their lottery. An individual who is very risk averse at low levels of consumptions – for
instance because of subsistence constraints – but not at higher levels of consumption may
be happy to form a group with a trustworthy risk loving person and leave the group when
loosing. By taking a fairly safe lottery and leaving in the event of loosing, she can be sure
that her consumption does not fall below a certain level but being matched with a risk
taker she get access to the higher expected payoﬀ from more risky lotteries. We illustrate
this point with the following example.
Consider individual 1 who has the following utility function. She has linear utility for
consumption levels greater or equal to 27 but inﬁnitely negative utility at consumption










In this case, in autarchy 1 would choose lottery 2 (which earns 27 or 57 with probability
1/2) and get utility ua = [27 + 57]/2 = 42.
Assume that 1 is in a group with 2 who chooses lottery 5 (which earns 10 or 110 with
probability 1/2). In this case, 1 would choose to leave her group upon loosing her gamble
because she would have a consumption of at most 20 (if she chooses lottery 1 that earns
30 for sure) when they both loose their lottery. However, if she stays with 2 when she wins






















[ 5 4+3 3 .5+8 3 .5] = 42.75.
This is better than autarchy.
B. Proofs.
Observation 1. Untrustworthy individuals in a match with an unfamiliar person prefer
leaving to staying upon winning their lottery.
Proof. Assume that individual 1 is without guilt and in a group with an individual 2
who with a probability λ selects lottery   s2 and stays in the sharing group; with probability42
(1 − λ)p selects lottery   s2 and leaves upon winning; and with probability (1 − λ)(1 − p)
selects s 
2 and leaves upon winning. If individual 1 ﬁnds it optimal to choose lottery s1
and strictly prefers to stay in the group irrespective of the outcome of her lottery, it must
be that at (s1,  s2,  s2,s  
2), 1 must prefer her strategy to leaving upon winning her lottery.






























Note that for any z2 ∈{   s2,s  
2}, u(
h(s1)
2 ) − u(
−s1
2 ) ≥ u(
−z2





































































This inequality requires   s2 >s 1.
Since u(
h(s1)
2 ) ≥ u(
h(s1)−s1
2 ) ≥ 1




















[exp(−ah(s1)) + exp(as1)]. (11)









































However, if individual 1 ﬁnds it optimal to choose lottery s1 rather than himself choosing
lottery
  s2
2 given (  s2,  s2,s  








































































This inequality cannot hold given (11) and (12) and therefore we have a contradiction.
Observation 2. An untrustworthy person would not leave the group upon loosing and
would not stay upon winning her lottery.
Proof.
Consider an individual 1 without guilt and with risk aversion a. Assume that 1 is in a
group with an individual 2 2 who with a probability λ selects lottery   s2 and stays in the
sharing group; with probability (1 − λ)p selects lottery   s2 and leaves upon winning; and
with probability (1 − λ)(1 − p) selects s 
2 and leaves upon winning. If individual 1 ﬁnds it
optimal to choose lottery s1 and leave upon loosing her lottery but stay when winning her
lottery, the following two inequalities must hold:
[i]A t( s1,  s2,  s2,s  
2), 1 must prefer her strategy to autarchy (she could only do better in
autarchy by choosing σo
1):
































;[ ii] she must prefer it to staying in the group (again she could only do better when staying
by re-optimizing her choice of lottery.):
w1(s1,  s2,  s2,s
 
2) >v 1(s1,  s2,  s2,s
 
2).



























































Since this is true for any   s2,   s2, s 
2, p and λ, it proves our claim.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a trustworthy individual i with risk preference ai
grouped with an unfamiliar individual j with announcement   aj. Let σi and σj be the
equilibrium choices of lottery for i and for j’s diﬀerent types, so that i’s utility is given by
  vi(σi,σj).
Now, notice that i’s utility can only be improved if she could choose her partner’s lotteries
as well as her own:
maxsi,sj  vi(si,sj) ≥   vi(σi,σj). (13)
i would always prefer the safest lottery possible (σ = 0) for her partner if he is untrust-
worthy. Using this in (4), we can rewrite the left-hand-side of inequality (13) as
φ(γ) ≡ max
si,s−i







2 )+ui(b − σ)+ui(b + h(σ))
 
, γ = p¯ t,  aj(j,  aj)i s
the probability that j is trustworthy and vi is the utility that i would have in a group with
a close friend or family member as in (3). Moreover, the inequality in (13) is strict when
γ<1 as an untrustworthy j would choose some amount of risk.
Notice that φ(γ) is increasing in γ. Indeed, i can always select s−i = si and for any s
vi(s,s) ≥ wi(si).




it is easy to check that i would choose σ = σ  =   σ(a∗
i). This is the same maximization and
therefore the same choice of lotteries that a group of friends or family with the same level
of risk aversion ai would select. Since there is a unique equilibrium and   σ(a )  =   σ(a∗
i) for
any a ∗
i , i’s utility is strictly higher when paired with a close friend or family member j
with the same risk aversion aj = ai. Moreover, it follows that i strictly prefers grouping










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sTable A2: Group-level analysis of defections: Dependent variable = proportion of members that default
[1] Density of close friends and  -0.062 * -0.032 -0.156 ***
family network within group  (0.035) (0.031) (0.052)
[2] Number of group members 0.027 0.001 -0.004
(0.032) (0.004) (0.004)
[1] x [2] 0.040 **
(0.016)
Average gamble choice 0.008 0.011 0.011
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
Proportion of females 0.116 * 0.033 0.032
(0.068) (0.039) (0.039)
Average age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Proportion living in municipal centre 0.042 0.027 0.017
(0.055) (0.028) (0.030)
Average years of education -0.010 * -0.010 ** -0.010 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Proportion married 0.003 -0.005 -0.008
(0.061) (0.038) (0.038)
Average log household consumption -0.006 -0.024 -0.023
(0.040) (0.029) (0.029)
Average household size 0.001 0.005 0.005
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -0.102 0.276 0.287
(0.456) (0.329) (0.330)
Municipality dummies no no yes
Observations 252 527 527
Groups of      
2 or 3
All groups
Notes: Linear regression coefficients reported. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account of non-independence
within municipalities by clustering; *** - sig. at 1% level; ** - sig. at 5% level; * - sig. at 10% level.    1    2     3
Difference in gamble choice (round 1) >  3 -0.127 *** -0.011 *** -0.010 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Friends and family 0.183 ***
(0.023)
Diff. in gamble choice >3 x Friends and family -0.002
(0.010)
Friends and family, reciprocated ties only 0.371 ***
(0.037)
Diff. in gamble choice >3 x Friends and family, reciprocated t -0.014
(0.013)
Geograpically proximate friends and family 0.237 ***
(0.035)
Diff. in gamble choice >3 x Geog. proximate friends and fam -0.024 **
(0.011)
Municipality dummy variables included yes yes yes
Number of observations 86518 86518 86518
Pseudo R-suqared 0.143 0.140 0.131
All dyads
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account of non-
independence within municipalities by clustering; *** - sig. at 1% level; ** - sig. at 5% level; * - sig. at 10% level.
Table A3: Dyadic analysis of assortative matching on risk attitudes using a dichomomized gamble choice 
variable Table A4: Dyadic analysis focusing on all family and friends and adding control variables
All dyads Other dyads
123





Diff. in gamble choice x Friends and family -0.004 *
(0.002)
Both recognised friendship 0.438 *** 0.272 ***
(0.043) (0.055)
Both recognised kinship 0.323 *** 0.200 ***
(0.077) (0.069)
One recognised friendship, other kinship 0.334 *** 0.195 **
(0.056) (0.092)
One recognised friendship 0.122 *** 0.009
(0.022) (0.042)
One recognised kinship 0.135 ***
(0.045)
One lives in municipal centre, other not -0.016 *** -0.055 ** -0.010 ***
(0.004) (0.022) (0.003)
Different genders  -0.012 ** -0.013 -0.013 ***
(0.005) (0.032) (0.004)











Difference in marital status 0.002 0.006 0.001
(0.003) (0.016) (0.003)
Difference in log household consumption -0.007 ** -0.018 -0.005
(0.003) (0.015) (0.003)









Sum of gamble choices (round 1) 0.001 0.005 1.60e
-4
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Number who live in municipal centre -0.003 0.013 -0.005 **
(0.003) (0.013) (0.002)
Number of females -0.005 0.010 -0.008 *
(0.005) (0.023) (0.004)
Sum of ages 7.55e











Number who are married 0.004 0.030 * 0.001
(0.003) (0.017) (0.003)
Sum log household consumption -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002)









Municipality dummy variables included yes yes yes
Number of observations 86518 9050
# 77442
Pseudo R-suqared 0.148 0.161 0.130
Friends and family
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account of non-independence within
municipalities by clustering; *** - sig. at 1% level; ** - sig. at 5% level; * - sig. at 10% level; 
# - 4 additional municipalities were 
dropped from this regression because, in one all of the dyads joined the same group and in all the others none of the dyads joined
the same group.Table A5: Dyadic analysis focusing on reciprocated ties of kinship and friendship and adding control variables
All Dyads Other dyads
   1    2     3
Difference in gamble choice (round 1) -2.35e
-4 -0.011 -0.001
(0.001) (0.014) (0.001)
Family and friends - reciprocated ties only 0.326 ***
(0.082)
Diff. in gamble choice x Family and friends -0.006 *
reciprocated ties only (0.004)
Both recognised friendship 0.038 * 0.081
(0.027) (0.052)
Both recognised kinship 0.003
(0.018)
One recognised friendship, other kinship -0.017
(0.076)
One recognised friendship 0.107 *** 0.098 ***
(0.015) (0.015)
One recognised kinship 0.118 *** 0.109 ***
(0.041) (0.039)
One lives in municipal centre, other not -0.016 *** -0.087 -0.013 ***
(0.004) (0.055) (0.003)
Different genders  -0.012 ** -0.038 -0.013 ***
(0.005) (0.073) (0.005)











Difference in marital status 0.002 0.028 0.002
(0.003) (0.053) (0.003)
Difference in log household consumption -0.007 ** -0.039 -0.006 **
(0.003) (0.037) (0.003)
Difference in household size 4.81e
-4 0.004 0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001)




Sum of gamble choices (round 1) 0.001 0.002 4.10e
-4
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Number who live in municipal centre -0.003 0.032 -0.005
(0.003) (0.026) (0.003)
Number of females -0.005 0.074 -0.008 *
(0.005) (0.053) (0.005)












Number who are married 0.004 0.070 0.002
(0.003) (0.053) (0.003)
Sum log household consumption -0.001 -3.91e
-4 -0.001
(0.002) (0.027) (0.002)










Municipality dummy variables included yes yes yes
Number of observations 86518 2608
# 83874
Pseudo R-suqared 0.159 0.139 0.133
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account of non-independence within municipalities 
by clustering; *** - sig. at 1% level; ** - sig. at 5% level; * - sig. at 10% level; 
# - 7 additional municipalities were dropped from this regression 
because, in 5 all of the dyads joined the same group and in 2 none of the dyads joined the same group.
Family and friends          




gamble choice (round 1) 0.001 -0.019 ** 2.75e
-4
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001)
Geograpically proximate friends and family 0.399 ***
(0.036)
Diff. in gamble choice 1 x Geog. prox.  0.267 ***
friends and family (0.070)
Both recognised friendship 0.309 *** 0.336 *** 0.382 ***
(0.053) (0.064) (0.042)
Both recognised kinship 0.106 *** 0.353 *** 0.217 ***
(0.018) (0.092) (0.064)
One recognised friendship, other kinship 0.099 *** 0.226 * 0.255 ***
(0.035) (0.121) (0.088)
One recognised friendship 0.059 *** 0.033 0.104 ***
(0.024) (0.066) (0.018)
One recognised kinship -0.012 *** 0.071
(0.004) (0.047)
One lives in municipal centre, other not -0.017 *** -0.014 ***
(0.005) (0.004)
Different genders -0.014 ** -0.078 -0.013 ***
(0.006) (0.066) (0.005)










Difference in marital status 0.005 0.059 * 0.003
(0.004) (0.035) (0.004)
Difference in log household consumption -0.009 ** -0.042 -0.008 **
(0.004) (0.036) (0.004)
Difference in household size 4.14e
-4 -0.005 0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Diff. in round 1 winnings -0.002 *** -0.020 *** -0.001 **
(0.001) (0.007) (4.60e
-4)
Sum of gamble choices (round 1) 0.001 -7.13e
-5 0.001
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
Number who live in municipal centre -0.007 * -0.013 -0.008 **
(0.004) (0.022) (0.004)
Number of females -0.012 *** -0.051 -0.012 ***
(0.004) (0.049) (0.004)
Sum of ages 1.59e









Number who are married 0.004 0.112 *** 0.002
(0.004) (0.038) (0.004)
Sum log household consumption -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.023) (0.002)






Sum of round 1 winnings -0.001 * 4.81e
-4 -0.001 **
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Municipality dummy variables included yes yes yes
Number of observations 70962 3622
# 67308
Pseudo R-suqared 0.157 0.171 0.133
Geographically 
proximate friends      
and family
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted to account of non-independence within municipalities; *** - sig. at 1% 
level; ** - sig. at 5% level; * - sig. at 10% level; 
# - 5 additional municipalities were dropped from this regression because 
in 1 all of the dyads joined the same group and in 4 none of the dyads joined the same group.
Table A6: Dyadic analysis focusing on geographically proximate family and friends, non-groupers excluded